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Executive Summary 
It is nowadays generally accepted that inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is crucial 
as a source of technological spillovers. One of the objectives of this paper is to review the 
evidence on the quantity and quality of human capital employed by domestic and foreign 
firms. We examine whether spillovers accrue from MNE activity, and provide a 
preliminary understanding of why MNE spillovers remain somewhat ambiguous, 
particularly in developing countries, paying particular attention to human capital 
development. Our analysis is supported by data from the Innovation Survey in Argentina. 
On the whole, MNE subsidiaries hired more professionals than domestic firms of the 
same size, possessed a more skilled labour force overall, and spent more on training than 
similar domestic firms. Subsidiaries in Argentina effectively have a higher labour 
productivity and pay higher wages. Yet, in terms of knowledge creation and utilisation, 
there was little to differentiate affiliates from domestic firms.  
While there is little evidence of widespread FDI spillovers, where spillovers did 
occur, it was where domestic firms demonstrated high investment in absorptive 
capacities. Our analysis also suggests that much of MNE activity  particularly after 
liberalisation - has been of the kind that by definition has limited opportunities for 
linkages and spillovers. These are activities in which MNEs may simply be able to 
generate economic rent from their superior knowledge of markets, and their ability to 
efficiently utilise their multinational network of affiliates. These assets are not generally 
easily spilled over to domestic firms.  
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FDI spillovers, absorptive capacities and human capital development: evidence from 
Argentina 
Rajneesh Narula and Anabel Marin 
 
1 Introduction 
It is nowadays generally accepted that attracting and embedding inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has important development effects because FDI represents an 
important source of technological spillovers. Although not the only means available, 
spillovers from FDI are regarded as one of the most practical and efficient means by 
which industrial development and upgrading can be promoted (Narula and Dunning 
2000). Indeed, attitudes towards MNEs and their importance for economic growth have 
converged over the last two decades, so much so that inward FDI is actively sought by 
most developing countries.  
Indeed, FDI is nowadays actively being promoted by the Washington consensus as 
a panacea for economic development. Structural adjustment programmes prominently 
integrate macroeconomic stabilization policies alongside policies to promote increased 
inward FDI.  In 1998, for example, 103 countries offered special tax concessions to 
foreign corporations that set up production facilities within their borders (Hanson, 2001). 
Other popular policy tools include the extension of tax holidays, exemptions from import 
duties and direct subsidies. 
While the potential for MNE-related spillovers is clear, as are the opportunities for 
industrial upgrading there from, it is increasingly acknowledged that the nature, level and 
extent of the benefits vary considerably. Indeed, under certain circumstances, FDI may 
not result in significant spillovers, and even where these occur, sometimes these 
spillovers may accrue to the foreign-owned sector rather than to the domestic sector 
(Katrak 2002).  
One of the most significant aspects of potentially positive spillovers are those 
associated with and through human capital development. There are two modalities by 
which MNEs can influence human capital in the host country: 
1. Spillovers can occur through direct means, as MNEs contribute to the 
generation of employment in the host country, which is to say they 
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increase the employment level quantitatively. At the same time, MNEs 
can also cause direct increases in the quality of the domestic workforce, by 
providing formal and informal training, as well as through the process of 
learning-by-doing to transfer their superior technological knowledge to 
their domestic employees.  
2. Spillovers can occur through indirect means, also both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. On a quantitative level because domestic suppliers and 
customers are expected to increase their own employment as a direct 
consequence of the increased economic activity due to MNE participation 
in the economy. On a qualitative level, firstly because MNEs affiliates are 
expected to provide training and technical assistance to domestic suppliers 
and, secondly, because domestic firms are expected to have access to more 
productive pools of potential employees who have been trained by MNE 
affiliates in newer and more productive technologies.  
 
One of the objectives of this papers is to review the evidence on spillovers accruing 
from MNE activity, and provide a preliminary understanding of why MNE spillovers 
remain somewhat ambiguous, particularly in developing countries, paying particular 
attention to human capital development. Our analysis is supported by data from the 
Innovation Survey in Argentina (1992/1996).  Argentina is a particularly interesting 
example for this study given that (as a result of rapid FDI growth in the 1990s) its 
manufacturing industry has become heavily dependent on foreign firms: 49.6 % of the 
largest industrial firms in 2002 were MNEs. When joint ventures are included, this figure 
rises to 77%. Moreover, Argentina has had a historical dependence on MNEs, and is 
regarded to have achieved a threshold level of absorptive capabilities. The Innovation 
Survey in Argentina, following the broad framework of the Oslo Manual, covers 
numerous aspects of the economic and technological behaviour of 1533 firms (283 of 
which are MNEs). The survey sample is representative of the universe of industrial firms 
in the country, and includes 50% of the total industrial firms, which account for 53% of 
total sales, 50% of total employment, and 61% of total exports (Annex 1 describes the 
firms and information covered by the dataset).  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Following this introductory section, section 
2 discusses some of the reasons why MNEs are considered a key agent for human and 
technological development. In section 3 we investigate direct and indirect effects from 
FDI in the case of Argentina. Different possible determinants or factors explaining 
diversity of results are explored in section 4. Finally, section 5 discusses broader 
conclusions.  
 
2.  The role of MNEs in global human capital: why the fuss? 
 
Despite the importance given to MNEs, they do not account for a dominant or even a 
major share of the worlds economic activity. As table 1 shows, in terms of employment, 
the worlds top 100 non-financial MNEs employed 14.3 million of the total 1.8 billion 
people employed worldwide in 2000, which represents less than 1% of total employment. 
Examining the same ratio for the entire universe of MNEs worldwide in the same year, 
MNEs employed only 3% of the total world economically active population (EAP) and 
6% of total people employed around the world.  
 
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
As table 1 also illustrates, MNEs play an even less significant role in the 
developing regions, where MNEs are estimated to represent less than 2% of total 
employment.  Thus, the contribution to domestic employment from FDI does not seem 
very impressive, from a quantitative point of view at least.  
Despite the relatively small role of MNEs on an aggregate level, the situations 
differ substantially across countries. As table 2 shows, MNEs account for less than 5% of 
the total employment in countries such as Japan and Indonesia, but this figure rises to 
well over 40% in countries such as Malaysia, Argentina and Ireland.  
 
***Table 2 about here*** 
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In addition, MNEs tend to have two characteristics that make them stand out. First, 
MNEs have been found to be concentrated in the more dynamic sectors of the economy 
(Harrison, 1999). Thus, even though they play a relatively small role in most economies 
in terms of level of total employment, MNEs often play a disproportionately large role in 
two very different types of industrial sectors. On the one hand, they tend to concentrate 
their activities in the more competitive or dynamic sectors typified by high growth rates 
and the use of new and emerging technologies (e.g., electronics, communication 
equipment, and industrial machinery). On the other, MNEs tend to dominate in mature 
sectors where economies of scale, branding and advertising determine market share (e.g., 
petroleum products, chemicals, automobiles, food and beverages and consumer goods). 
In such sectors, while the technology underlying these industries may be diffused and 
codified, capital limitations and marketing capabilities have meant that just a few MNEs 
maintain a large share of the global market.  Based on data from Argentina, Table 3 
illustrates this trend well.  
 
***Table 3 about here*** 
 
In Argentina, foreign firms have a very strong participation in sectors such as 
electronics (78% sales and 65% of total employment), communication equipment (49% 
of sales and 50% of total employment) and machinery and equipment (46% of sales and 
employment). They also dominate sectors such as petroleum (89% of sales and 79% of 
employment), chemicals (66% of sales and 57% of employment) and rubber and plastic 
products (66% of sales and 56% employment).  
The second reason why MNE activity has significant policy implications is that the 
share of MNEs in both types of sectors have been seen to be increasing, largely due to the 
policies associated with the so-called new economic model (NEM). The increased role of 
MNEs in certain sectors is in part a result of aggressive liberalisation of FDI regimes and 
privatisation programmes. Indeed, the greatest change has been the reduction in state 
ownership and the subsequent privatisation of assets. Between 1988 and 1999, $107.3 
billion worth of privatised firms in the developing countries had been acquired through 
cross-border M&A. The share of Latin America and the Caribbean was roughly 79.8% 
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(UNCTAD 2000). In other words, during this period, about 20% of the total inflows to 
this region were associated with privatisation. During the period 1999-2000 alone, 
privatisations totalled US$ 19.5 billion (ECLAC 2001). 
Argentina is again a good example of this phenomenon, as it liberalised its 
economy along the lines of the NEM in the 1990s1 and the role of FDI increased most 
significantly in those sectors most affected by liberalisation, deregulation and new 
investment incentives to attract foreign capital. Table 4 shows changes in FDI 
participation in total sales by sector of activity between 1990 and 1998. For example, FDI 
participation in the telephony services sector increased from less than 1% before 1990 to 
100% in 1998. The same can be said for utilities, which include electricity, gas and water 
services, and the informatics and communications equipment sectors. Also, sectors such 
as minerals, fishing, chemicals, petroleum, and pharmaceuticals benefited by 
liberalisation to external capital after the structural reforms at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
***Table 4 about here*** 
 
The growth of MNEs and their dominance of certain sectors is often associated 
with their pre-eminent position in the creation and ownership of technological assets. 
That both developing and developed countries alike can benefit from spillovers accruing 
from MNE activity is not disputed, as these assets are proprietary and are not easily 
duplicated. However, it remains an assumption that MNE activity is a sine qua non for 
economic development, and that greater FDI flows will automatically result in the 
dissemination of these technologies and organisational practices among countries and 
specially, from developed to developing countries.   
 
3. Examining direct and indirect effects of FDI in Argentina 
There is considerable evidence to indicate that spillovers may not occur in as 
efficient a manner as the neo-classical economic theory might suggest. Indeed, much of 
                                                 
1 As an example, in 1969 tariffs in Argentina averaged 61% with a dispersion of 103%, in 1990 this 
average dropped to 17% with a dispersion of only 31%, and tariffs were further reduced later on (a very 
limited number of sectors escaped full liberalisation, such as automobiles). 
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the evidence on developing countries points to very limited indirect benefits from FDI. 
Non-significant or negative spillovers have been obtained previously also by Haddad and 
Harrison, (1991 and 1993) (Morocco), Aitken and Harrison (1999) (Venezuela), 
Braconier et al, (2001) (Sweden) Chung, 2001 (USA), Konings, (1999) (Bulgaria and 
Romania), Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech Republic. We examine below the 
evidence for Argentina. 
 
3.1  Direct effects  
Human capital development plays a crucial role in the dissemination of 
technological knowledge from MNEs to the domestic economy. Indeed, the labour 
market is one of the main ways in which new technological knowledge is expected to 
disseminate to the domestic economy through two means. First, there should be a tangible 
increase in the employment levels of workers in the host location. Second, there is 
expected to be an increase in the quality of the workers potentially available to work in 
other companies or start their own companies in the same country. This second 
opportunity for direct spillovers is through the (expected) provision of formal training 
and education to their workers or potential workers.  However, there is no concrete 
evidence that MNEs always train employees, and where they do so, there is considerable 
variance in the quality of this training (for recent reviews, see e.g., Ritchie 2002, JIBICI 
2002). Moreover, FDI in certain locations seek unskilled labour to perform simple 
assembly-type or resource extractive activities. Although the employment and training of 
unskilled labour also provides spillovers, these are regarded as being of a smaller 
magnitude, particularly in a middle-income country such as Argentina.  
In this sub-section the evidence for the Argentinean case is used to evaluate 
subsidiaries direct contribution to domestic human capital development relative to their 
domestic counterparts. Table 5 shows the results of the comparison. The variables 
evaluated are: the use of professional workers (engineers and other professionals in 
production and R&D activities), an index of skills (professionals/non-professionals 
workers), and the total expenditure in training activities.  
Most measurements in Table 5 are reported as differences across foreign and 
domestic firms in percentage. Thus, for example a value of 27% in the first column for all 
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sectors indicates foreign firms hire 27% more professionals than domestic firms, even 
after adjusting for size (measured by total number of employees), which is significant at 
the 1% level.  
 
***Table 5 about here*** 
 
On average for all sectors, subsidiaries hired more professionals than domestic 
firms with the same size, possess a more skilled labour force, and spend more in training 
than similar domestic firms. In addition between 1992 and 1996 they improved the skills 
ratio more than domestic firms did. There are however, some exceptions when each 
sector is evaluated individually2. For instance, there are 6 sectors (out of 19) where 
domestic firms spent more than subsidiaries in training (leather, printing, stone, clay, 
primary metal industries, fabricated metal products and precision), and 3 sectors where 
domestic firms employed more professionals (printing, stone and primary metal 
industries). Moreover, in the more dynamic sectors such as electronics, machinery and 
motor vehicles the differences are not significant (with exception of skills for machinery). 
 
The next section discusses indirect effects and the possibilities for technological 
upgrading in other firms / domestic institutions derived from FDI. 
 
3.2 Indirect effects on domestic firms and other external economic agents 
 
MNEs subsidiaries need to interact with domestic external economic agents (in 
particular, firms and non-firms) in order to carry out their normal operations in the 
country, and these interactions constitute one of the ways in which skills and 
technological transfer are expected to disseminate to the rest of the economy.  
While the most significant aspect of indirect spillovers occurs due to domestic 
firms, Linkages with domestic non-firm actors are another way in which technologies and 
skills introduced/developed by subsidiaries might disseminate to the rest of the economy. 
                                                 
2 Annex Table A1 shows the number of foreign and domestic firms by sector. These are the base number of 
observations used to compare across sectors. 
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The non-firm sector consisting of public research institutes, universities, organisations for 
standards, intellectual property protection, etc that enables and promotes science and 
technology development (see Narula 2003a for a discussion).  UNCTAD (1999) gives 
several examples of cases where MNEs give formal financial and technical support to 
domestic educational institutions in host countries. The Argentinean survey asked 
subsidiaries about their domestic linkages with institutions, specifically, the number and 
type of domestic institutions of science and technology they contact in the country, and 
how often they interacted with them.  Subsidiaries interacted with domestic institutions of 
science and technology more often than domestic firms on average, therefore in this sense 
subsidiaries are not less embedded than domestic firms in the case of Argentina. Thus, 
this represents an alternative channel for technology transfer and human capital 
development. Indeed, through their linkages with domestic institutions foreign firms may 
transfer knowledge and know-how to workers in domestic institutions, and in this way 
domestic firms might also benefit indirectly to the extent they also use these same 
domestic institutions. However, data in the survey does not permit us to evaluate the 
extent and efficacy of this modality, and we must necessarily concentrate here on indirect 
effects to the domestic firm sector. 
 
 
3.2.1 Spillovers to domestic firms 
 
In many cases the transfer of technological knowledge to domestic agents might 
occur through backward and forward linkages when MNEs provide training and technical 
assistance to their local suppliers, subcontractors and customers. But local competitors 
might also benefit from subsidiaries presence when; 1) subsidiaries demonstrate new 
technologies and new ways to use them, or when 2) highly skilled staff, trained in the 
foreign firm move to incumbent domestic plants taking with them knowledge acquired in 
the affiliates.  
 
The effects from increased competition due to FDI are not so clear. Ideally, 
increased competition resulting from FDI might induce domestic technological 
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improvements by contributing to the elimination of inefficient indigenous firms, 
encouraging the birth of new innovative firms and, inducing local firms to react to the 
foreign threats by assimilating foreign technologies and mobilising resources. But, as 
noted by Caves (1974) and Chung (2001) this effect should not be considered a spillover 
effect because it does not involve any flow of knowledge. In addition, as noted by Aitken 
and Harrison (1999), an increased competition associated with foreign presence might 
also reduce productivity of domestically owned firms if foreign firms draw demand from 
them and they have to cut production and increase costs 3. 
Indirect effects are usually evaluated empirically by analysing the level or change 
in productivity of domestic firms that are in some way related with MNE affiliates. The 
assumption is that technological spillovers are reflected in productivity improvements of 
the domestic firms. The ideal way to evaluate these effects would require us therefore to 
identify domestic competitors and suppliers. But due to limitations on data about linkages 
between the two groups we follow common practice and analyse productivity 
improvements of domestic firms localised in the same 5-digit sectors as the subsidiaries4.  
We model MNE contribution to the technological change of domestic firms within 
the context of a production function5. The results of the externalities or spillovers from 
FDI are expected to affect domestic firms productivity growth.  FDI is treated as an 
additional input explaining productivity growth, and the coefficient of the FDI 
regressor is taken as evidence consistent with spillovers from FDI to the domestic sector. 
Variations of the following basic equation (equation 1) were used to investigate these 
effects:  
 
iijijiij IiGZFDItFDIInputY εηϕδλ ++++∆+∆+∆=∆ lnln  (1) 
 
                                                 
3 Indeed there is no agreement about the relationship between FDI, competition and technical change in 
domestic firms. Conventional wisdom has mostly argued that FDI will introduce more competition in local 
market and therefore that local efficiency will be improved. However, some empirical works have found 
that FDI may increase concentration rather than competition, although it is also argued that some times 
concentration may promote innovation.   
4 Due to the lack of data we were not able to test for the possible presence of regional or inter-sectoral 
spillovers.  
5 Annex 2 explains the derivation of this model. 
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In equation (1) the subscripts i and j denote plant and industry, ∆ represents changes 
in the variables between 1992 and 1996, and λ, δ, ϕ, and η the parameters to be 
estimated. Y denotes added value at plant level, Input, its use of normal inputs, FDI is a 
measure of FDI participation at industry level and plant level denoted by subscripts i and 
j respectively. G is a categorical dummy variable that distinguishes independent domestic 
firms from those that are part of an economic group, and I is the 2-digit industry where 
the firms operate.  
For Input we use I/Y (instead of capital as explained in Annex 2), and total 
employment. FDI is the share of total employment in industry j accounted for by foreign 
owned plants. The participation in employment (rather than capital) by industry was 
chosen as an indicator of FDI participation as the turnover of workers seems the more 
obvious channel for intra-sectoral spillovers effects. MNE subsidiaries are those plants 
with at least 10% foreign equity. Finally, Z includes a set of additional variables that may 
affect TFP growth in domestic firms:  
a) ∆ Knowledge Capitald = Changes in R&D expenditures reported by the domestic 
firms plus changes in the expenditures on new equipment specifically oriented to 
products or process innovation6; 
b) ∆ Skills = Changes in the ratio of professional/non-professional workers 
(professionals include engineers and other professionals in production, 
administration and R&D); 
c) ∆ Comp = Changes in competition.  
 
We expect that increases in R&D expenditures and in skills will positively affect 
changes in total factor productivity since this affects domestic firms knowledge capital 
(Griliches 1991). Consequently, we control for these variables in order to compare 
domestic firms with the same potential for increasing total factor productivity and to be 
able to isolate the effects of FDI into domestic firms productivity growth. 
                                                 
6 R&D expenditures are not a good indicator of the efforts made by firms in developing countries in 
knowledge capital augmenting, since these efforts are generally not formalised in R&D activities in these 
type of countries. Consequently we have included expenditures in equipments for product or process 
innovation as an additional indicator of these efforts. 
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As discussed earlier, FDI might also affect the level of competition in local 
markets, and through this channel, domestic firms survival, behaviour and performance. 
To control for this effect, following Sjoholm (1997), Chung (2001), and Haskel et al 
(2002) we introduce in the regression four measures of potential competition: 1) the level 
and changes in mark-up or rents at firm level, 2) changes in market share at firm level, 3) 
changes in import penetration at the 5-digit industry level, and 4) changes in industry 
concentration measured by the changes in the Herfindahl index. Mark-up is calculated as 
the difference between sales and costs over total sales, so decreased mark-up indicates 
heightened competition, with firms prices decreasing towards costs. Changes in market 
share is measured by increases in the firms sales of own products as a proportion of the 
five digits industry sales, and changes in import penetration are the changes in total 
import over total sales by 5-digit industry. We expect that - to the extent that these indices 
reflect changes in the levels of competition- changes in allocative and technical efficiency 
produced by an increased FDI should be captured by the index. Additionally, these 
variables should also capture changes in other unobservable variables that affect 
competition and that might have disciplined the domestic industry to become more 
efficient. Improvements in the efficiency of domestic industry are particularly relevant, as 
Argentina undertook significant market reforms during the period in question.  
By using a plant level specification and modelling in first differences -with a time 
lag of 4 years- we control for fixed differences in productivity levels across industries, 
which might affect the level of foreign investment.  In this way, we address the 
identification problem observed by Aitken and Harrison (1999) who have shown that in 
industry level cross section studies a positive result might reflect the fact that foreign 
firms are attracted to the more productive industries rather than a spillover effect7.  
In addition, this specification and the inclusion of industry and group dummies 
correct for the omission of unobservable variables that might undermine the relationship 
between FDI and productivity growth of domestic firms. By observing changes over the 
time we remove plant-specific and industry and region fixed effects such as differences in 
the long-term strategy of the domestic firms, the regional infrastructure and differential 
                                                 
7 We cannot completely rule out the possibility of spurious correlation if there are industry characteristics 
that change over the time and affect FDI localisation.  
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technological opportunity of the industries. The dummies control for characteristics of 
domestic firms that belong to an economic group or that operate within particular sectors, 
and that to the extent that they affect productivity growth of domestic firms, this might 
affect the relation between FDI increases and productivity growth in these firms8. 
The expanded equation is thus9: 
ij
d
ijjii
iiiij
i
i
i
d
i
d
IGpenConcenMarkupMarkup
MShCKSkillsFDIFDI
Y
ILY
εααηαα
ααααααα
+++∆+∆++∆+
∆+∆+∆++∆++∆=∆
Im
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7654321
 
 Table 6 shows the results for two different specifications used in order to 
investigate the effects of FDI on productivity growth.  Column (1) reports the results of 
the OLS estimation column (2) the results for the WLS estimation, controlling for size of 
firms. The coefficient for ∆FDIj measures indirect effects or spillovers and the coefficient 
for FDIi the direct effects. Thus, if the technology superiority of foreign firms spreads at 
industry level to domestic firms the coefficient of ∆FDIj should be positive, and if foreign 
ownership increases the productivity of the plants, then the coefficient for FDIi should 
also be positive.  
 
***Table 6 about here*** 
                                                 
8 There might still be a bias in the estimators if there are important unobservable variables that change 
across firms and over the time (such as managerial abilities). However, corrections for this possible bias as 
noted by Griliches and Mairese (1995) require restrictive assumptions about markets and might introduce 
additional biases.  
9 Where: 
∆lnY i =The log change in total sales 
∆lnLi =The log change in total employment 
I/Li =Total investment over total product 1992 
∆FDIpartj =The change in FDI participation by industry measured by the change in the share of foreign 
employment over the total employment of the industry at the five-digit level  
∆Skillsi =The change in the ratio professional/non professional workers 
∆KCi =The log change in R&D expenditures plus the log change in the expenditures in new equipment for 
product and process innovation 
∆MShi =The change in market share 
∆Markupi =The change in mark-up measured by the difference between sales and costs over total salesfirm level 
Markupi =The level of mark-up in 1992 
∆Concenj =The change in Herfindahl index- industry level  
∆Impenj =The change in import penetration industry level 
εi = ∆ui 
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As can be seen in table 6, the added value of the firms in Argentina increases with 
changes in the employment of domestic firms, their knowledge capital, skills, market 
share and the import penetration at the industry level. In addition, the OLS estimations 
indicate that foreign ownership contributes to productivity growth of the firms. However, 
changes in FDI participation at industry level seem not to contribute to productivity 
improvements of the firms in the same industry: in both cases the coefficient is positive 
but not significant. In addition, when using WLS instead of OLS in order to control for 
firm size (column 2), the coefficient for FDIi becomes insignificant. So, for firms of 
similar size foreign ownership does not seem to contribute to productivity growth.  
In line with previous studies that have used panel data therefore, we find no 
evidence of technological spillovers (or dynamic externalities) from FDI in Argentina 
between 1992 and 1996. Benefits of foreign firms activities in the Argentinean economy 
are not reflected in domestic firms value added growth, even when these activities have 
in theory a high potential for technological spillovers. This is somewhat surprising, since 
we earlier found foreign firms on average develop domestic human capital to larger 
extent than domestic firms. However, the impact on domestic firms value added growth 
of these superior activities and performance is not reflected in domestic firms value 
added growth.  
There are several possible explanations for these results. Foreign firms activities 
might affect other qualitative dimensions rather than value added growth of domestic 
firms, and these effects may not be captured by the traditional production functions 
approach. It might also be that the time lag used (4 years) is not appropriate to capture the 
effects of the foreign firms activities on domestic firms value added 10.  
However, as we will discuss in section four, there are two other possible 
explanations for this apparent absence of spillovers. First, it may be a result of MNEs 
type of operations in this host country, such that there are very limited spillovers, and 
                                                 
10 However, according to Mansfield and Romeo (1980), this time lag seems adequate. In their study, US 
MNEs reported that the technologies deployed to their affiliates abroad reached host country competitors 
anywhere from zero to 6.5 years with a model response of 0.5 to 1.5 years and a mean of about 4 years. 
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second, it might reflect an insufficient absorptive capacity on the part of domestic firms 
such that they are unable to internalise the benefits of foreign firms superior activities.  
 
4. What determines the extent of the benefits from FDI? 
 
The evidence in the case of Argentina confirms much of the literature in that the benefits 
from MNE spillovers are not always positive or tangible, and that the extent to which 
spillovers and linkages occur is intermediated by a number of factors. These factors can 
be classified into two categories: 
1. Those associated with the MNE; 
2. Those associated with the absorptive capacity of firms and countries. 
 
These two factors are themselves highly interdependent. It needs to be 
acknowledged that the ability of the domestic economy to benefit from MNE investment 
crucially depends on the relative technological capabilities of the recipient and the 
transmitter. And at the same time, those MNE investments will depend on domestic 
capabilities.  
 
4.1 MNE-specific factors.  
 
The previous sections have demonstrated that FDI does not automatically lead to 
positive externalities. It is important to realise that MNEs are not in the business of 
economic development, and rarely interested in the explicit transfer of knowledge. 
Ceteris paribus, they prefer to use technologies that are suited (first and foremost) to their 
own needs, and the purposes for which they have made the investment. MNEs do not 
make available their proprietary assets at the whims of governments; rather they tailor 
their investment decisions to the existing market needs, and the relative quality of 
location advantages, especially skills and capabilities in which the domestic economy has 
a comparative advantage (Lall 2002: 17).  
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4.1.1.  The nature MNE firm-specific assets 
There are two points we wish to make: First, that while it is a reasonable assumption that 
MNEs are in possession of superior firm-specific assets, the assets that they bring to any 
given location are not always those which domestic firms necessarily seek to acquire- or 
even  are able to acquire. Keep in mind that the MNEs competitive advantages derive 
from two types of firm-specific assets: First there are those associated with technological 
assets in the traditional sense of being technological/engineering assets, such as 
machinery and equipment, and in the personnel who operate and maintain them. These 
are asset-specific ownership advantages, and it is these that the neo-classical and neo-
technology economics literature concentrate on as being the source and basis for 
spillovers (see e.g., Markusen 1998, Carr et al 2001).  The second type of firm-specific 
assets are those associated with conducting transactions efficiently, that derive from 
being able to generate rent by virtue of superior use of intra-firm hierarchies, both within 
and across national borders.  In addition there are those that derive by virtue of the 
multinationality of the firms and can be termed advantages of common governance. 
These are transaction-type firm-specific assets (see Dunning 1993, Cantwell and Narula 
2001). Although the economics literature does not acknowledge this, MNEs can exist in 
the absence of technology type ownership advantages, generating rent simply from its 
superior knowledge of markets and hierarchies. Thus, MNEs may possess the same (or 
even inferior) technology-type assets relative to its domestic counterparts, yet still out-
compete them. For instance, simply a privileged access to a market, or the possession of 
entrepreneurial skills. In such cases, technological spillovers - in the conventional way 
they are understood - will not occur. However, other types of spillovers might occur, and 
they will affect other dimensions rather than the technological ones in domestic firms.  
Second, it is an unreasonable assumption that domestic firms will automatically 
benefit from MNE assets, either because the domestic firms do not have the capacity to 
do so (discussed in the next section), or because the assets are strongly firm-specific in 
nature as is the case with transaction-type ownership advantages. That is, such 
transaction-type firm-specific assets cannot be acquired easily or through direct means, 
since they are highly tacit, firm-specific and largely uncodified.  
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This makes quantitatively measuring such spillovers incredibly difficult, and we 
must resort to an anti-monde argument. That is to say, we must project what might 
occur in another world. Let us begin with the fundamental assumption that the MNE 
must possess some kind of advantage over domestic firms. Let us further assume that 
there are two types of firm-specific assets which allow the generation of economic rent. If 
we can demonstrate that MNEs do not possess technology-type advantages over domestic 
firms then the MNE must be in a position to utilise the second type of asset to generate 
economic rent.  
In order to explore these issues for Argentina we evaluate the relative performance 
and behaviour of both groups of firms. In table 7 the following indicators are considered: 
imports of inputs; exports controlled by size (sales); and real wages. Most performance 
measurements in table 7 are reported as differences across foreign and domestic firms in 
percentage terms. Thus, for example a value of 69 in the first column for all sectors 
indicates foreign firms on average pay their workers 69% more than domestic firms, and 
this difference is significant at 1%.   
 
***Table 7 about here*** 
 
In general the differences indicate that foreign firms in Argentina pay higher 
salaries and import more in the aggregate even after controlling for size. Subsidiaries on 
average import significantly more inputs than domestic firms, even when the differences 
by size of the firms are controlled. However, they do not export significantly more than 
local firms. The differences in imports are significant for both years at the aggregate level 
(28% and 42% in 1992 and 1996 respectively)11. But the differences in exports are not 
significant on average when the size is considered12. 
                                                 
11 Note that when the sectors are considered individually the number of firms that import inputs in most 
sectors are not enough to provide statistical significance. The only sector where the difference is important 
and significant (and only in 1996) is petroleum refining and related industries (313%). At the same time, 
the difference in 1996 is significant but negative that favour domestic firms- in the sector miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries  (-181%). For the remaining sectors the differences are not significant in any 
direction. 
12Nevertheless, for some sectors the difference is significant. In rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 
the difference is positive, favouring subsidiaries. In both years, in food and kindred products, precision, 
photographic, medical and optical goods the difference favoured subsidiaries only in 1992, and only in the 
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The difference in wages is an especially interesting indicator because it indicates 
differences in the quality of the human capital. Additionally, higher salaries for 
professional workers are thought to reflect improved quality of labour by introducing 
incentives in the labour market13. At the aggregate level, the difference is significant for 
both periods: 69% for 1992 and 70% for 1996. Additionally, in 12 out of the 20 sectors 
the difference is positive and significant favouring subsidiaries14.  
Turning to technological knowledge creation and use, the differences between 
domestic and foreign firms are not quite as large. In order to evaluate technological 
creation and use the following variables are used: imports of capital goods, other 
acquisitions of embodied technologies, investments in equipment for innovations, R&D 
expenditures, and use of R&D labs. Table 8 and 9 show the results of the comparison for 
these variables.  
Most measurements in Table 8 and 9 are reported as differences between foreign 
and domestic firms in percentage. Thus, a value of -17% in the first column indicates 
foreign firms invest less in imported capital goods than domestic firms, even when they 
have similar size (measured by total number of employees).  
 
***Table 8 and 9 about here*** 
 
The data suggests that subsidiaries in Argentina might be more productive than 
domestic firms (table 8) and pay higher wages than domestic firms. However, MNE 
affiliates are not head-and-shoulders ahead of domestic firms when indicators of 
technological knowledge creation and use are evaluated, there is little to differentiate 
affiliates from domestic firms. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that 
superior technological assets explain their superior performance.  
                                                                                                                                                 
case of petroleum refining and related industries does the difference favour domestic firms in 1996 (-
209%). 
13 In a recent review, Lipsey (2002) concluded that, the evidence seems to be overwhelming that foreign-
owned firms in all kinds of economies pay higher wages than domestically owned firms. But he suggests 
at the same time that is it is not as yet clear whether these higher salaries reflect higher skills or some other 
effects, such as higher capital intensity or retention salary. 
14 These sectors are food and kindred product, paper, printing, chemical, rubber, stone, primary metal 
industries, electronic, communications, precision, photographic and medical instruments and miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries.  
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On average, subsidiaries spend more on R&D and more on the imports of 
disembodied technologies, but they do not use more R&D labs than domestic firms, they 
do not expend more resources in order to acquire embodied technologies (as measured by 
imports of capital goods and total investments in capital goods) and they do not invest 
more in equipment and machinery. Moreover, the tables show a very high frequency of 
situations where domestic firms perform better in all these dimensions.  
The evidence would therefore suggest that some MNEs operating in Argentina are 
able to generate rents not based exclusively on the local exploitation of their own superior 
technological assets, but also as a result of superior transaction-type ownership 
advantages.  Moreover, as we have suggested before, this might be one of the 
explanations for the absence of clear evidence on technology spillovers despite the 
increased participation of FDI in Argentina. 
The literature on spillovers also tends to ignore another important factor: that not 
all MNE subsidiaries will provide spillovers and linkages to the same extent. By way of 
example, the potential for spillovers and linkages from a warehouse and distribution 
facility are fundamentally different from a manufacturing affiliate. Furthermore, not all 
subsidiaries are embedded in the local economy: some affiliates are weakly embedded 
(say in the case of an affiliate in an export processing zone). The extent of embeddedness 
of a subsidiary is a function of many factors. The next subsection discusses this issue.  
 
4.1.2 Motives of investment as a determinant of spillovers 
The motive of an investment helps to determine (in conjunction with the host-
country specific factors) the kind of MNE affiliate and therefore the potential for 
spillovers. It is generally acknowledged that there are four main motives for investment: 
to seek natural resources; to seek new markets; to restructure existing foreign production 
through rationalisation, and to seek strategically related created assets (Narula and 
Dunning 2000). These in turn can be broadly divided into two types. The first three 
represent motives which are primarily asset-exploiting in nature: that is, the investing 
company's primary purpose is to generate economic rent through the use of its existing 
firm-specific assets. The last is a case of asset-augmenting activity, whereby the firm 
wishes to acquire additional assets, which protect or augment their existing created assets 
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in some way. In general, developing countries are unlikely to attract much asset-
augmenting FDI. In general, developing countries have tended to receive FDI that is 
primarily resource-seeking, market-seeking or efficiency seeking, and the relative 
importance of each is a function of the stage of economic development which itself is a 
function of the quality of its absorptive capacity (Narula and Dunning 2000, Narula 
2002). Least developed countries will tend to have a predominance of resource-seeking 
FDI, while in countries such as Argentina, which can be regarded as being in the 
catching-up stage, a majority of FDI might be directed towards market-seeking, while 
efficiency seeking investments would be the exception rather than the rule. Resource-
seeking FDI would still be important, but of less significance than market-seeking FDI. 
As countries approach the frontier (e.g., NICs), efficiency seeking FDI will tend to 
dominate. 
Once the decision to enter a given market through FDI is taken, the kinds of activity 
and the level of competence of the subsidiary are co-determined by the nature of the 
location advantages of the host location. That is to say, while MNE internal factors such 
as their internationalization strategy, the role of the new location in their global portfolio 
of subsidiaries, and the motivation of their investment are pivotal in the structure of their 
investment, they are dependent on the available location-specific resources which can be 
used for that purpose. Indeed, the host countrys location advantages play an important 
role in determining the level of embeddedness of the subsidiary (Benito et al 2003), and 
this is the primary determinant of the quality of the FDI. This is for two reasons. First, the 
level of competence is a function of the quality of the location advantages that the host 
location can provide. High competence levels require complementary assets that are non-
generic in nature, and are often associated with agglomeration effects, clusters, and the 
presence of highly specialized skills. In other words, firms are constrained in their choice 
of location of high competence subsidiaries by resource availability. For instance, R&D 
activities tend to be concentrated in a few locations because the appropriate specialized 
resources are associated with a few specific locations. Second, MNEs have been shown to 
prefer to engage in sequential investment in locations that provide sub-optimal returns but 
with which they have prior experience, because firms are known to be boundedly 
rational. Furthermore, while the scope of activities undertaken by a subsidiary can be 
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modified more or less instantly, developing competence levels takes time. MNE 
investments in high value-added activities (often associated with high competence levels) 
have the tendency to be sticky. Such subsidiaries tend to be embedded with the local 
milieu in terms of linkages with suppliers, customers and domestic institutions. The 
linkages are both formal and informal, and will probably have taken years  if not 
decades  to create and sustain.  As such, the embeddedness of firms is often (but not 
always) a function of how long the MNEs have been present, since firms tend to build 
incrementally. This has been observed to be the case in East Asia (See e.g., Rasiah 1994, 
1995), but it is to be noted that firms build on location advantages that already exist in 
the host economy (Ritchie 2002), and increases in embeddedness are generally in 
response to improvements in the domestic technological and absorptive capacity (see 
section 4.2 for a discussion of absorptive capacity).  
 
4.1.3 The Case of Latin American FDI 
The point that we are trying to highlight is that not all affiliates provide the same 
opportunity for spillovers. A sales office may have a high turnover, employ a large 
number of staff, but the technological spillovers will be relatively fewer than, say, a 
manufacturing facility. Likewise, resource seeking activities such as mining, can be 
capital intensive, but also provide fewer spillovers than say, a market-seeking type of 
FDI. During the import substitution era, most MNE affiliates in developing countries 
were either of the truncated miniature replica (TMR) variety (market-seeking) or single 
activity affiliates (focused on resource seeking activity) (Narula 2003b). MNEs 
responded to investment opportunities primarily by establishing miniature replicas of 
their facilities at home, although the extent to which they were truncated varied 
considerably between countries. The extent of truncation was determined by a number of 
factors, but by far the most important determinants of truncation- and thereby the scope 
of activities and competence level of the subsidiary - were associated with market size, 
and capacity and capability of domestic industry15. Countries without a domestic sector 
and with low demand were host to the most truncated subsidiaries, often to the point of 
                                                 
15 The determinants of truncation are discussed in greater detail in Narula (2003b) upon which much of this 
discussion is based.  
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being single-activity subsidiaries. Activities were primarily in sales and marketing, and 
natural resource extraction. Larger countries with domestic technological capacity (such 
as Brazil and India) were host to the least truncated subsidiaries, often with R&D 
departments.   
With liberalisation, the strategies of MNEs were affected vis-à-vis their affiliates 
competence and scope in four different ways (Narula 2003b). First, there was some 
investment in new affiliates resulting in new (greenfield) subsidiaries that did not exist 
previously, and secondly through sequential investment as firms upgraded the scope and 
competence of existing subsidiaries. Third, there was also a downgrading of subsidiaries, 
whereby MNEs divested their operations in response to better location advantages 
elsewhere, or reduced the intensity of operations by lowering the level of competence 
and/or scope of their subsidiary, and shifting from truncated replicas to single activity 
affiliates.  Fourth, there was a redistribution effect as a result of privatisation activity, 
That is, sectors that were dominated by domestic capital were transferred to foreign 
ownership. This also, in many cases led to a downgrading of activities from truncated 
replica to single activity affiliates.  
In general, greenfield investments in new affiliates in Latin America have tended to 
be more specialised, single or multiple activity investments associated with efficiency-
seeking or resource seeking strategies, with relatively little sequential FDI.  Most of the 
truncated miniature replicas that served small captive markets during the import 
substituting era were downgraded, as part of a regional rationalisation particularly in 
sectors where the low productivity of affiliates production was supported through trade 
barriers-induced market distortions. MNEs have taken advantage of liberalisation to 
exploit production capacity in fewer locations to exploit economies of scale, especially 
where local consumption patterns are not radically different to justify local capacity and 
where transportation costs are not prohibitive. This has meant that some TMRs have been 
downgraded to sales and marketing affiliates, which can be expected to have fewer 
opportunities for spillovers.  It is ironic that the countries that receive the kinds of FDI 
that has the highest potential benefits vis-à-vis human capital development are those that 
already have a highly developed domestic absorptive capacity. In other words, domestic 
capacity  whether in the form of knowledge infrastructure or efficient domestic 
 23
industrial sector - is a primary determinant of high competence foreign affiliates. Some 
countries have succeeded in attracting such FDI, notably Mexico, and the Caribbean 
Basin (ECLAC 2000, 2001, Mortimore 2000). In addition to providing domestic 
capabilities and a threshold level of infrastructure, these countries have invested in 
developing knowledge infrastructure (although to a lesser extent in the case of Mexico). 
Mortimore (2000) argues persuasively that much of this FDI has have resulted in creating 
export platforms for the MNEs, with limited benefits for the host countries involved (for 
a more in-depth discussion, see ECLAC 2001). 
 
4.2 Absorptive capacity as a determinant of linkages 
 
Kokko (1994) suggests that spillovers depend on the MNEs having a higher 
productivity level than domestic firms. That is, a tangible technology gap must exist.  It 
bears emphasising that this presumes two preconditions. First, that domestic firm in the 
industry exist, and second, they possess the capacity to usefully internalise the knowledge 
being made available by the MNE (indirectly or directly). In other words, the domestic 
industry must possess the absorptive capacity to efficiently exploit spillovers.   
It is essential that we take a systems view of an economy, and that in doing so we 
acknowledge that all the economic firm and non-firm actors within an industry are 
indivisibly interlinked.  If the institutions and organisations are absent or underdeveloped, 
economic actors within the system will be unable to absorb and efficiently internalise 
knowledge. Absorptive capacity includes the ability to internalise knowledge created by 
others and modifying it to fit their own specific applications, processes and routines. It is 
worth noting that absorptive capacity is a subset of technological capability, which in 
addition to absorptive capability includes the ability to generate new technologies through 
non-imitative means.  This does not imply that absorption is purely about imitation. Firms 
cannot absorb outside knowledge unless they invest in their own R&D, because it can be 
highly specific to the originating firm, since it has a partly tacit nature. The extent to 
which a firm is able to exploit external sources of knowledge thus depends on its 
absorptive capacity which is assumed to be a function of its R&D efforts, and the degree 
to which outside knowledge corresponds to the firms needs as well as the general 
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complexity of the knowledge. An important component of absorptive capacity is the 
availability of an appropriate supply of human capital, which in turn is not always 
specific to firms, but associated with the capabilities of the non-firm sector. Non-firms 
determine the knowledge infrastructure that supplements and supports firm-specific 
innovation. They account for a certain portion of the stock of knowledge at the national 
level which may be regarded as general knowledge in the sense that it has 
characteristics of a public good, and is potentially available to all firms that seek to 
internalise it for rent generation.   
Thus, even where technological assets are made available  either through 
licensing, or indirectly through spillovers from inward FDI  the domestic sector may not 
be in a position to internalise these assets. Borenzstein et al (1998) and Xu (2000) have 
both shown that FDI has a positive impact on economic growth only in those developing 
countries that have attained a certain minimum level of absorptive capacity. Knowledge 
accumulation is much more rapid once the initial threshold level of absorptive capacity 
exists. Simply put, technology absorption is easier, once they have learned-to-learn 
(Criscuolo and Narula 2002). The cost of imitation increases as the follower closes the 
gap with the leader and the number of technologies potentially available for imitation 
reduces. This implies that there are diminishing returns on marginal increases in 
absorptive capacity as firms approach the frontier of knowledge. 
Table 10 deals with the issues technology gap and absorptive capabilities and 
technology spillovers from FDI in the case of Argentina. In this table we report the 
results of two additional estimations, based in equation (1) described in section 3 in 
order to evaluate how the technology gap and absorptive capabilities of domestic firms 
affect spillovers from FDI.   
 
***Table 10 about here*** 
 
Column (1) shows the estimation of spillovers for all domestic firms. Column (2) 
shows estimates for those firms in sectors characterised by a high technology gap 
between subsidiaries and indigenous firms, while column (3) shows estimates for those 
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located in sectors with low technology gap16. This classification still suggests  as in 
section 3 - that spillovers for all domestic firms are positive but not significant17, as 
shown by the coefficient of dFDIj in column (1). The distinction of sectors according 
different levels of technology gap also does not provide us with significant results. 
However, when we run the same regressions but only include firms with high 
absorptive capacity, we get very different results, as shown by column (4) and (5) in the 
table 10. The high absorptive capacity group are defined as those firms that have 
invested more in new equipment oriented to product/process innovation or those that 
have invested more in training activities, For such domestic firms, spillovers from FDI 
are positive and significant. In other words, only those domestic firms that have invested 
in absorptive capacities receive positive spillovers from FDI18. 
Domestic firms which have more efficiently internalised spillovers have a larger 
investment in appropriately qualified and trained employees.  Because technologies  no 
matter how generic  have a certain firm-specific aspect to them, any form of knowledge 
spillover needs to be decoded from the transmitters firm-specific context to that of the 
receivers (Cantwell 1991). In other words, absorption is not purely about imitation. 
Firms cannot absorb outside knowledge unless they invest in their own R&D, because it 
can be highly specific to the originating firm and be partly tacit in nature. In addition, 
absorptive capacity is assumed to be a function of the firms R&D efforts, as well as the 
degree to which outside knowledge corresponds to the firms needs, and the general 
complexity of external knowledge.  
 
 
                                                 
16 We calculate technology gap by regressing the value added per employee of all firms in 1992 across 
different industries after controlling for capital intensity, scale and knowledge capital of the firms. In this 
regression the coefficient of a dummy variable with the value 1 for foreign firms, and 0 for domestic firms, 
indicates the average gap by industry. On this basis industries in Argentina were divided in two groups: 
with high technology gap (an average difference higher than the median) industries 34, 26, 36, 21, 32, 23, 
22, 27, 15 and 29, or with high technology gap (an average difference lower than the median) 19, 31, 25, 
24, 17, 28, and 33. 
17 It should be noted that in this case we are only considering domestic firms for the regression, so all 
variables described in section three such as value added growth, employment, skills, etc are introduced only 
for domestic firms. 
18 The regressions for domestic firms with low levels of absorptive capabilities in this respect provide 
insignificant spillovers again. The results are not included in this paper for space, but are available upon 
request from the authors. 
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4.3 The non-firm sector 
It should be noted that the internalisation of spillovers depends not just on domestic 
firms having a high absorptive capacity, or that MNEs provide spillovers, but that the 
host country also be able to provide appropriately educated employees to both domestic 
firms and MNEs. It is important to stress that while human capital represents a core 
location advantage and a primary determinant of FDI (most recently confirmed by 
Noorbaksh et al 2001), not all of FDI is associated with the presence of a skilled work 
force.  Indeed, studies have shown that certain kinds of FDI is directed to locations where 
absorptive capacity is low, in that firms seek untrained labour to perform simple 
assembly-type or resource extractive activities. Indeed Narula and Wakelin (1998) find 
that indicators of skilled human capital not to be a significant determinant of FDI or trade 
in developing countries, although significant in developed countries. Indeed, it may be 
that MNEs seek locations with low-skilled workers (Narula 1996). In other instances, 
MNEs seek trainable employees (i.e., personnel who have learned to learn), and then 
through training to provide the necessary skills to perform specialised tasks. As we have 
discussed in the previous section, the motive of investment plays a significant role in 
determining what kinds of human resources firms seek, and to what extent MNEs will 
undertake training of employees.  
The non-firm sector is also important in providing appropriate training and 
education to generate potential employees of foreign and domestically owned firms, but 
also to undertake the provision of quasi-public goods in the form of innovative output and 
capacity. Progress towards more technology-intensive manufacturing activities depends 
on the existence of high tech infrastructure (Rasiah 2002). This type of infrastructure is 
key if firms are to be able to internalise and absorb externally generated technologies, and 
to create their own. Such infrastructure plays an important role in promoting the 
innovatory and absorptive capacity of firms. It also acts as a mechanism to direct 
technology strategy and as a mechanism to overcome market failure.  It is important to 
understand that while learning and absorption takes place at the firm level, the success or 
failure of individual firms occurs in orchestration with an entire system. Within any 
system, there exists a broader non-firm-specific knowledge base by non-firm actors that 
is crucial to a country-level understanding of the process of technological accumulation. 
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Non-firm actors determine the knowledge infrastructure that supplements and supports 
firm-specific innovation.  They account for a certain portion of the stock of knowledge at 
the national level which may be regarded as general knowledge in the sense that it has 
characteristics of a public good, and potentially available to all firms that seek to 
internalise it for rent generation.  
In the scenario where the necessary absorptive capacity is not present, instead of 
learning from inward FDI, domestic investment may be crowded out where the 
domestic innovation system is too weak to compete with the foreign sector (see e.g., 
Agosin and Mayer 2000).  
How the non-firm-specific knowledge base in Argentina contributes to or limits the 
diffusion of technological spillovers in the country is a complex matter, since this is a 
country characterised by very contrasting features in this subject. 
It is striking for instance that Argentina is the only Latin American country whose 
scientists have received Nobel Prizes in Science (three Nobel prizes were conferred to 
Argentinean researchers in biosciences since the 1950s). By 1992 the country had nearly 
attained universal primary education. Secondary school enrolment was 59%, 40% was in 
tertiary education and about 20% of the age group between 20 and 25 was in higher 
education (Censo de Poblacion 1992). In comparison, in 1992, Brazil had only 19% and 
12% of enrolment in secondary and tertiary education, Chile 52% and 26% and Korea 
85% and 15%. According to the World Bank, Argentina in 1995 had an illiteracy rate of 
3.8% % while the same proportion for Brazil was 16.7%, for Mexico 10.4% and for 
Korea 4.2%. Between 1975 and 1990 the number of university students grew by 43.5% in 
Argentina. By 1993, 8.6% of the working population had reached higher education, 
27.1% secondary education and 54.9% primary level (Censo de Poblacion 1992). 
Indeed, all evidence points to a well developed system as a result of considerable 
efforts devoted by the government from the 1950s to develop a strong science and 
technology infrastructure, but that has recently started to decline as a results of diverse 
factors. In 1997, for instance total expenditures on education represented only 1.5% of 
GNP, well below that of Brazil (4.6%). Moreover, even when the number of university 
students has been growing, the public expenditures devoted to universities decreased 
since 1975 from US$1094 to US$808 million, and as a result the expenditures per student 
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fell considerably (to $1500), below the level of Brazil universities (around $10,000 
(Correa, 1998).  
R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP are well below the average in developed 
regions and even below the levels reached by the more successful developing countries. 
It was only 0.29% of GDP in 1993 while countries such as Taiwan expended 1.3% of 
GDP in S&T (in 1988) and Brazil 0.89% in 1990. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The evidence reviewed in this paper would indicate that the story regarding 
spillovers from FDI in the case of Argentina is similar to that of many other developing 
countries. On the whole, MNE subsidiaries hired more professionals than domestic firms 
of the same size, possessed a more skilled labour force overall, and spent more on 
training than similar domestic firms. Subsidiaries in Argentina effectively have a higher 
labour productivity and pay higher wages. Yet, when measured in terms of knowledge 
creation and utilisation, there is little to differentiate affiliates from domestic firms. In 
other words, there is little evidence to suggest that superior technological assets explain 
their superior performance. Furthermore, the benefits of MNE activities in the 
Argentinean economy are not reflected in domestic firms value added growth, even 
when these activities have in theory a high potential for technological spillovers. At the 
same time, our results also indicate that domestic firms which have more efficiently 
internalised spillovers have a larger investment in absorptive capacity.   
Although these results might appear to be contradictory, they reflect different aspects of a 
complex tapestry. The fact that FDI activities do not demonstrate significant spillovers to 
the economy at large indicates that not all FDI provides the same opportunities for 
spillovers and linkages.  For instance, resource-exploiting investments (say, in mining) 
seek to provide unprocessed raw materials (a relatively low value adding activity) which 
act as inputs to other affiliates that may be located elsewhere. It is in traditional, more 
mature sectors that foreign firms seem to have significantly influenced domestic 
productivity, and where foreign firms seem to out-perform domestic firms significantly. 
In the so-called dynamic and new technologies sectors which are typically regarded as 
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providing the highest potential for spillovers, domestic firms tend to outperform foreign 
affiliates in most measures of technological and absorptive capabilities. Our results 
confirm the opinion expressed by Mortimore (2000) that although Latin American 
countries have succeeded in attracting a large quantity of FDI, it has thus far ignored the 
issue of quality of FDI.  
At the same time, our analysis also points to a common oversimplification made by 
researchers in the field: that MNEs tend to possess technological assets superior to 
domestic firms. While this may be true in some instances, it is by no means always the 
case. MNEs may possess firm-specific assets that are associated with transaction-
efficiencies and the benefits of common governance. That is to say, MNEs may simply be 
able to generate economic rent from their superior knowledge of markets, and their 
ability to efficiently utilise their multinational network of affiliates. These assets are not 
generally easily spilled over to domestic firms, or at least, cannot be measured through 
conventional means.  
It seems an obvious conclusion that spillovers need to be internalised if they are to 
provide tangible benefits to domestic firms. At an aggregate level Argentina is well-
endowed with technological and scientific infrastructure. This has been a partial 
explanation for many of the other countries for which similar results have been found. 
Argentina represents a country with a fairly highly developed level of absorptive 
capabilities.  However, at the firm level, there is considerable variation, and our results 
indicate that firms that have invested more heavily in training and new equipment for 
innovation have benefited from FDI spillovers.  
Our results  although tentative  indicate that FDI per se is not necessarily the 
most effective way to promote technological upgrading and industrial development, 
especially where domestic firms are not equipped with the capacity to absorb and 
internalise spillovers. . Although FDI is an important means by which domestic firms can 
be made more competitive, this should be part of a more holistic development strategy. 
The work of Lall (see for instance 1996, 2002) points to the need of a holistic approach 
that includes governments, firms and non-firms. 
It should be recalled that MNEs are unwitting development tools: their primary 
objective is to generate profits. MNEs do not provide training and other opportunities for 
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human capital development because they are philanthropic; they do so because they need 
to do so to optimize their profit making potential (Kapstein 2002, Slaughter 2002). MNEs 
seek to optimise their return on investment, and this logically requires that they minimize 
their costs. By definition, any investment in human capital development is an additional 
cost. When MNEs find that they have to provide basic education and skills to their 
workers - what should ordinarily be a public good (a case of hierarchies having to 
overcome government failure) they are less inclined to invest. MNEs do not do so 
lightly, or without consideration of the benefits. MNEs are creatures of the market par 
excellence, responding efficiently to supply and demand conditions, and changes in these. 
They do not make such investments unless there is an opportunity for rent-seeking. 
Our final point is this: It is wrong for governments or institutions associated with 
the Washington consensus to assume that FDI will substitute for domestic investment. 
Governments have a responsibility for policies to promote linkages, to encourage the 
development of domestic firms, and the development of important infrastructure and the 
maintenance of essential non-firm sector activities which provide the raw material for 
absorptive capacity.   
It should be noted that the under-investment in public infrastructure will likely have 
considerable long-term consequences. While the NEM model has helped correct many 
inefficiencies, inter alia, improve important macro-economic fundamentals, and reduce 
the excessive role of the state in domestic industrial activity, it has also led to a rapid and 
overzealous reduction in the states involvement in the provision of public and quasi 
public goods which are necessary conditions for industrial development (Ramos 2000, 
Katz 2001, Alcorta and Peres 1998, Alcorta 2000). 
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TABLES: 
Table1: The role of MNEs in global employment, 2000 (in thousands)  
Regions Total Population Economically active 
population (EAP) 
Total Employed 
population 
World 6056307 2947598 1825629 
More developed regions 1191021 601011 393976.2 
Less developed regions  4865286 2346586 1431652 
Top 100 MNEs  14300 14300 
% Over world  0.5% 0.8% 
All MNEs  102140 102140 
% Over world  3.5% 5.6% 
Source: LABORSTA database (ILO) and World Investment Report 2001 
Note:  
The information on employment is not complete for developing countries. ILO provides 
information on employment in the1990s for 127 of 242 countries. Nevertheless, as all the major 
recipients of FDI are included, the estimations can be considered to be largely accurate. 
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Table 2:FDI participation in total employment by country 
Country Year Percentage of workers employed by 
MNEsl 
  Manufacturing All industries 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Austria 1988 NA 9.8 
 1996 19.8 9.9 
Finland 1992 5.3 1.8 
 1997 12.5 6.7 
France 1987 16.8 NA 
 1992 16.9 NA 
Germany 1985 6.6 NA 
 1996 13.0 5.1 
Ireland 1985 40.9 NA 
 1990 45.6 NA 
Italy 1985 16.0 NA 
 1993 17.4 NA 
Japan 1985 0.6 0.3 
 1995 1.2 0.5 
Netherlands 1985 15.2 4.9 
 1994 19.1 NA 
Norway 1985 7.4 NA 
 1994 9.0 NA 
Sweden 1985 7.7 2.7 
 1996 18.0 7.0 
U Kingdom 1985 13.7 NA 
 1992 18.2 NA 
United States 1985 7.0 2.7 
 1996 10.8 3.9 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Brazil 1987 24.3 16.2 
 1995 13.4 3.5 
China 1987 NA 0.2 
 1997 NA 4.1 
Hong Kong 1985 10.2 NA 
 1994 16.0 12.8 
Indonesia 1992 3.3 0.5 
 1996 4.7 0.9 
Malaysia 1985 29.8 NA 
 1994 43.7 NA 
Mexico 1985 42.7 NA 
 1993 17.9 3.3 
Nepal 1998 1.9 NA 
Singapore 1980 52.0 NA 
 1996 52.1 NA 
Argentina 1992 39.0 NA 
 1996 41.0 NA 
Source: UNCTAD 1999, Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes: The participation of foreign employment for Argentina was estimated using the information 
provided by the Innovation Survey. 
a All industries mean whole economy.  
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Table 3: FDI participation in the Argentinean industrial sector (1996) 
Sectors Share of foreign firms, 1996 (%) 
  
Total 
employment Total sales Number of firms
Tobacco Industries 100 100 100 
Petroleum refining and related industries 79 89 46 
Electronics 65 78 19 
Stone clay glass and concrete products 55 68 27 
Chemicals and allied products 57 66 44 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 56 66 22 
Primary metal industries 62 62 22 
Paper and allied products 43 55 18 
Motor vehicles and equipment 54 54 34 
Communication equipment 50 49 29 
Machinery and equipment 46 46 15 
Food and kindred products 31 42 13 
Precision, photographic medical optical 22 38 20 
Lumber and wood products except furniture 25 29 7 
Textile mill products 28 28 8 
Leather and leather products 23 26 11 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 17 25 6 
Fabricated metal products 22 20 15 
Printing publishing and allied products 14 14 13 
Transportation equipment 1 1 5 
Apparel and other finished products 0 0 0 
Computer and office equipment 0 0 0 
Source: Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
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Table 4 FDI participation in Manufacturing and Services in Argentina: 1990-1998 
Sector 1990 1992 1997 1998 
Sectors Participation on total sales (%) 
Manufacturing  
Motor vehicles and equipment 92 94 99 100 
Computer and communication equipments 94 96 98 98 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 57 66 88 88 
Paper and allied products 0 1 69 75 
Other manufacturing industries 48 31 60 64 
Pharmaceuticals 62 43 60 63 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 69 66 62 58 
Oils and cereals 50 37 61 57 
Printing publishing and allied products 0 13 19 54 
Petroleum Refining and related industries 32 37 48 49 
Others Food, kindred products and tobacco 34 39 50 49 
Electronics 40 25 53 48 
Stone clay glass and concrete products 21 24 46 44 
Fabricated metal products and machinery 26 28 37 37 
Leather and leather products 35 29 30 37 
Textile mill products 6 2 9 17 
Refrigerating 18 10 18 15 
Primary metal industries 0 0 2 4 
Other industries     
Telephone Communications 93 95 100 100 
Electric and gas services and water transportation 0 0 99 98 
Mining 27 36 31 66 
Wholesale Trade (Imports) 100 59 54 65 
Fishing 36 59 50 57 
Transportation and storage 34 36 50 53 
Retail Trade 20 19 43 53 
Communication (TV services) 0 0 72 45 
Other services 13 17 38 41 
Trading of primary products 23 33 34 37 
Construction, building and engineering work 13 15 7 15 
Source: Chudnovsky and Lopez (2001) 
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Table 5: Human capital development: difference between foreign and domestic 
firms (in percentages) (1996) 
Sectors   
Professional 
Employeesa 
Professional 
Employeesb Skillsc 
Changes in 
Skills b 
Training 
expenditures
All sectors 27*** 1.30 97*** 3** 85*** 
Food and kindred products 45** 6.90 117*** 6*** 115*** 
Textile mill products 5 8 112*** 0 167 
Leather and leather products 62 2 7 1** -174 
Lumber and wood products 50 2 169* -5 164 
Paper and allied products 34 -11 105 -11 20 
Printing, publishing and allied prod -67** 24** 35 6 -20 
Petroleum refining and related 9 8* 101** 1 136 
Chemicals and allied products 6 1 62*** 4 53 
Rubber and miscellaneous 22 -13** 43* 1 110 
Stone clay glass and concrete p -3 11 78*** 0 -16 
Primary metal industries -30 -3 10 0 -62 
Fabricated metal products 12 5 38 1 -33 
Machinery and equipment 21 -1 67*** -5* 16 
Electronic 23 -6 47 -3 129 
Communication equipments 37* 13 81 43 1 
Precision, photographic medical, op 57 7 178** 7%* -64 
Motor vehicles and equipment 4 -2 31 1 56 
Transportation equipment 35 49** 36 6  
Miscellaneous 32 8 72 0 132 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes:  
The differences are controlled by size 
a As a percentage of the total employment 
b Measured in first differences and express changes in the variable analysed, changes in the use of 
professionals between 1992 and 1996 and changes in the index of skills. 
c Skills is calculated as the ratio of professionals non professionals workers by firm 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 6: Indirect effects: Technological spillovers towards domestic firms: 
Regressing added value at the plant level on inputs, knowledge capital (R&D and 
skills) and the share of foreign firms at the industry levela 
Variables All sample 
 Coefficients 
 
OLSb 
(1) Weighted Least Squaresb (2) 
I/Y 0.031 0.045 
  (1.17) (1.27) 
∆lnL 0.63 0.61 
  (14.54)*** (14.28)*** 
∆FDIj 0.03 0.11 
  (0.1) (0.36) 
∆lnCK 0.026 0.023 
  (3.3)*** (3.02)*** 
∆Skills 0.13 0.12 
  (2.87)*** (2.87)*** 
Markup92 -0.2 -0.19 
  (-4.56)*** (-3.93)*** 
∆Markup -0.0003 -0.00027 
  (-4.53)*** (-4.13)*** 
∆Market share 4.12 4.1 
  (9.41)*** (9.68)*** 
∆Imppen 0.0000006 0.0000006 
  (2.79)*** (-2.37)** 
∆Concentration -0.6 -0.66 
  (-2.13)** (-2.37)** 
FDIi 0.00069 0.00048 
  (1.97)** 1.44 
Constant 0.091 0.11 
  1.3 (1.87)* 
Observations 1300 1300 
R2 47% 48% 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes:  a  All standard errors, in parenthesis, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *significant at 10 % level, 
**significant at  5% and *** at 1% level. 
The dependent variable is the difference of the natural log added value. Changes in employment and 
knowledge capital (L and CK) have been also introduced in natural logs, so their coefficients express 
elasticities. Investment over product is for 1992. Mark-up, the changes in mark-up and the changes in 
market share are firm level, changes in import penetration and concentration, at industry level. All 
estimations include a group dummy and 21 industry dummies. ∆FDIi measure changes in foreign 
employment participation at the 5-digits industry, and FDIj the participation of foreign capital at firm level, 
which might vary between 0 and 100.  
b In column 1 and 2 the estimations are for all firms, including domestic firms and subsidiaries. The 
coefficient for FDIj reflects the effects of foreign ownership in the plants productivity growth and the 
coefficient of ∆FDIi participation at industry level the indirect effects or spillovers. Column 1 reports the 
results of the OLS estimation and column 2 the GL, weights being the firms size.  
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Table 7: Subsidiaries’ performance relative to domestic firms; Sales per worker, wages, exports and imported inputs: 
Differences between foreign firms and domestic firms 
 Wages Exports Imported Inputs 
 1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 
Industry % Diff % Diff %Diff %Diff %Diff %Diff 
All sectors 69*** 70*** 1 8 28%** 42*** 
Food and kindred products 54*** 67*** 42** 55 -5 64* 
Textile mill products 30 28* 0 56 -98 -104* 
Leather and leather products 41 48 0 -16 -35 83 
Lumber and wood products, except furniture 73* 66 0 -15  -57 
Paper and allied products 47* 73** 0 6 136 131 
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 68** 68** 0 -129 -1 -78 
Petroleum refining and related industries 47 35 -1 -209** 55 313* 
Chemicals and allied products 48*** 49*** 0 25 43 22 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 62*** 54*** 54** 106** 42 36 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 85*** 90*** -29 -44 15 29 
Primary metal industries 56** 51** 6 61 51 -4 
Fabricated metal products 27 22 -19 89 -9 -22 
Machinery and equipment 50*** 31** -30 -66 14 69 
Electronic and other electrical equip/components 75*** 61*** 3 131 123 99 
Communication equipment 53* 82*** 40 -94 60 139 
Precision, photographic, medical, etc 109*** 95*** 22 81 -381* -114 
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 17 26 61** 20 -16 -29 
Transportation equipment 20 76    201 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 113*** 96*** 118* 42 -68 -181** 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Innovation Survey in Argentina 1992-1996 
Notes: 
Tobacco products, apparel; and computer and office equipment are not included because there are not enough observations 
The differences are controlled by size 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 8: Subsidiaries’ technological behaviour relative to domestic firms; Imports of capital goods, technology imports, 
investment in equipment for innovations and investments in capital goods: Differences between foreign firms and domestic 
firms 
Variables Capital goods Imports Technology Importsa Investments in equipment for 
innovations 
Investments in capital goods
Sectors 1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 
All sectors -17 -10 7 29** 5.80 22 4 17 
Food and kindred products 57** 44* 82** 56* 67* 41 57* 36 
Textile mill products  -92** -119* -142** 6 -85 -23 10 
Leather and leather products -37 72 -52 110  173 -2 100 
Lumber and wood products -15 209** 139 389** 190 -277** 196 97 
Paper and allied products -39 -17 -53 67 -138 132 -7 70 
Printing, publishing, allied industries -89 -117 -27 -93 37 -70 -44 -78 
Petroleum refining, related industries 177 -77  11 -369 -596 -94 -151* 
Chemicals and allied products 65 21 45 37 83* 60 10 21 
Rubber, miscellaneous plastics products -21 12 15 8 -384 -3 -124** -5 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products -32 -33 -47 22 148 73 38 96 
Primary metal industries 32 -89 61 49 -171 104 -57 84 
Fabricated metal products  -37 -39 21 34 -558 34 52 -6 
Machinery and equipment -8 46 3 50 -104 -31 -30 -8 
Electronic, electrical equip. components 132 184* 156 284** -87 249* -15 198** 
Communication equipment -24 6 -162 14 -151 31 -15 11 
Precision, photographic, medical, etc. 47 -460** 52 -484**   -82 -71 
Motor vehicles and equipment 29 -18 25 -1 -232 -56 -21 -65 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries -211 -217* -226** -205* -89  -5 3 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes: 
Tobacco products, apparel, computer and office, and transportation equipments are not included because there is not enough observation 
a Includes imports of disembodied technologies and payments for licences 
The differences are controlled by size 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 9: Subsidiaries’ technological behaviour relative to domestic firms; R&D 
expenditures and use of R&D laboratories 
 Sectors 
R&D 
expendituresa 
Number of firms that possess R&D 
labs 
 1996 1996 
  Difference Chi square test (Observed/expected) 
  Subsidiaries DF 
All sectors 30%** 0.99 1.00 
Food and kindred products 43 1.07 0.99 
Textile mill products 155** 0.71 1.03 
Leather and leather products -106   
Lumber and wood products -253 1.36 0.97 
Paper and allied products 108 0.44 1.12 
Printing, publishing and allied products 151* 0.35 1.10 
Petroleum refining and related -89 1.30 0.74 
Chemicals and allied products -36 0.98 1.02 
Rubber and miscellaneous -51 0.78 1.06 
Stone clay glass and concrete p -24 1.21 0.92 
Primary metal industries -78 1.53 0.85 
Fabricated metal products -4 1.10 0.98 
Machinery and equipment -9 0.72 1.05 
Electronics -41 0.74 1.06 
Communication equipments 34 1.17 0.93 
Precision, photographic medical,  14 1.02 1.02 
Motor vehicles and equipment 132*** 1.10 0.95 
Transportation equipment    
Miscellaneous  0.97 0.97 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes: 
Tobacco products, apparel, and computer and office equipments are not included because there are 
not enough observations. 
a Average difference in R&D expenditures controlled by total sales 
The differences are controlled by size 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 10: Technology gap, absorptive capabilities and technology spillovers 
from FDI 
          Domestic firms in sectors with: 
Domestic firms with high absorptive 
capabilities in respect of: 
Variables All domestic firms 
High Technology 
Gap 
Low Technology 
Gap 
Investments in new 
equipment for 
product/process 
innovation Training 
       
I/Y 0.021 0.25 0.0005 0.52 0.2 
  (1.02) (2.63)*** (0.03) (3.35)*** (1.57) 
∆lnL 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.45 0.58 
  (13.6)*** (8.83)*** (9.27)*** (4.46)*** (5.18)***
∆FDIj 0.24 0.38 -0.24 1.39 0.95 
  (0.74) (0.9) (-0.46) (1.97)** (1.78)* 
∆lnCK 0.028 0.028 0.031 0.018 0.025 
  (3.02)*** (2.18)** (2.31)** 1.09 (2.09)**
∆Skills 0.15 0.16 -0.13 -0.17 0.18 
  (2.71)*** (3.18)*** (-0.79) (-1.21) (7.08)***
Markup92 -0.19 -0.25 0.4 0.25 0.21 
  (-4.42)*** (-4.8)*** (3.9)*** (2.29)** (199)**
∆Markup -0.0003 -0.0003 0.58 0.58 0.14 
  (-5.12)*** (-6.44) (5.01)*** (5.17)*** 1.3 
∆Market share 4.41 4.21 4.8 3.8 3.8 
  (8.02)*** (6.31)*** (4.1)*** (3.8)*** (3.79)***
∆Imppen 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.84 0.027 
  (2.92)*** (2.12)** (1.7)* (-1.18) (0.67) 
∆Concentration -0.67 -1.02 -0.35 0.088 -0.1 
  (-2.11)** (-2.31)** (-0.66) (2.54)** (-0.13) 
Constant 0.087 0.072 0.051 -0.031 0.086 
  (1.15) (0.98) (0.53) -0.69 (1.84)***
Observations 1073 608 3.72 200% 200 
R2 46% 45% 53% 61% 53% 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 1992-1996 
Notes:  a  All estimations use OLS. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
*significant at 10 level, **significant at  5% and *** at 1% level. 
The dependent variable is the difference of the natural log added value for domestic firms. Changes in 
employment and knowledge capital (L and CK) have been also introduced in natural logs, so their 
coefficients express elasticities. Investment over product is for 1992. Mark-up, the changes in mark-up and 
the changes in market share are firm level, changes in import penetration and concentration, at industry 
level. All estimations include a group dummy and 21 industry dummies.  
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ANNEX 1: The Innovation Survey in Argentina: Firms and information collected 
1-The firms 
The National Survey on Technology Behaviour of Manufacturing Firms in Argentina 
(1992-1996) covers the technological behaviour and productivity performance of 1533 
firms 283 multinational subsidiaries and 1250 domestic firms. The Survey is 
representative of the universe of manufacturing firms in the country, including 50% of 
the total firms, which explain 53% of total sales, 50% of total employment and 61% of 
total exports in manufacturing activities. 
 
The Survey was carried out in 1996, but the firms provided 4 types of information: 1) For 
the year 1996 (for instance participation of foreign capital refers to 1996), 2) for 5 points 
in time from 1992 to 1996, year by year (for instance expenditures in R&D employees is 
provided for the 5 years), 3) Referred to two points in time: 1992 and 1996 (for example 
sales, exports, and investments were provided for 1992 and 1996), and 4) Referred to all 
the period (for instance improvements introduced in products and processes covers all the 
period) 
 
Table A1 shows the distribution of firms, sales and employment according ownership. An 
enterprise is considered to be an MNE subsidiary when the participation of foreign capital 
is higher than 10%.  
Annex Table A1: Subsidiaries and domestic firms in the survey: sales and 
employment (1996) 
Type of firm  Number of firms Total sales (in 
thousands) 
Total employment 
Subsidiaries Total 283 24600 132630 
 % 18% 52% 41% 
Domestic firms Total 1250 22500 192325 
 % 82% 48% 59% 
Total Total 1533 47100 394955 
 % 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Argentinean Innovation Survey 
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Annex Table A2: Domestic and foreign firms by industry 
  Industries Domestic Firms Subsidiaries 
  All sectors 1245 283 
15 Food and kindred products 300 45 
16 Tobacco 0 2 
17 Textile mill products 119 11 
18 Apparel and other finished products 47 0 
19 Leather and leather products 23 3 
20 Lumber and wood products 42 3 
21 Paper and allied products 27 7 
22 Printing, publishing and allied products 60 9 
23 Petroleum refining and related 7 6 
24 Chemicals and allied products 81 64 
25 Rubber and miscellaneus 64 18 
26 Stone clay glass and concrete p 52 19 
27 Primary metal industries 43 12 
28 Fabricated metal products 67 12 
29 Machinery and equipment 118 21 
30 Computer and office equipment 2 0 
31 Electronic 50 12 
32 Communication equipments 15 6 
33 Presicion, photographicm medical, op 18 5 
34 Motor vehicles and equipment 47 24 
35 Transportation equipment 18 1 
36 Miscellaneus 45 3 
 
 
2- The Information 
 
The information covered by the database may be classified in 4 main areas: firms level 
indicators of performance and productivity, investments and efforts carried out in order to 
acquire external technologies, internal technological efforts and capabilities, and 
innovative output and strategy. Specifically, each area includes: 
 
1. Performance, productivity 
(a) Total sales, (1992-1996)19 
(b) Total exports and composition (goods, services, technology and technical assistance) 
(c) Total number of employees between 1992 and 1996 by activity and qualification. 
 
2. Availability and acquisition of externally developed technologies 
(a) Composition of investments in fixed assets  
                                                 
19 The added value by firm for 1996 was obtained from other sources 
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(b) Characteristics of the main investments in fixed assets  
(c) Automation and control, computation and technologies of information quantity and 
mount of central equipment, quantity and mount of PC in administrative, technical 
application, and other applications, quantity and mount of control systems and 
automation 
(d) Acquisition of information technologies  
(e) Total imports values and composition  
(f) Total imports of capital goods and composition  
(g) Main reasons to import capital goods  
(h) Payments to national and foreign private enterprises for licences and technology 
transfer  
(i) Type of consulting hired  
(j) Characteristics of the consulting about production, organisation of the productive 
system, products, commercialisation, organisation and business management  
(k) Type of agreements with other firms or institutions (1992/96)  
(l) Linkages and contacts with Argentinean Institutions of Science and Technology  
 
3. Internal technological efforts and capabilities 
(a) Number of employees between 1992 and 1996 by activity and level of qualification 
(b) Organisational structure of the R&D activities  
(c) Expenditures in personnel (staff) devoted temporarily or permanently to innovation 
activities and main activities of the personnel: basic research, applied research, 
development of products or process, adaptation of products or processes, Technical 
assistance to production, engineering of projects, administrative reorganisation, 
general organisation, commercialisation of new products, total) 
(d) Other expenditures in innovation activities (basic research, applied research, 
development of products or process, adaptation of products or processes, technical 
assistance to production, engineering of projects, administrative reorganisation, 
general organisation, commercialisation of new products, total) 
(e) Sources of information for innovation (experimental own R&D, production, linked 
firms, headquarters or other subsidiaries, competence, reverse engineering, customers, 
enterprises of consulting, suppliers of equipment and materials, universities, public 
institutions of research, private institutions of research, licences and patents, 
conferences, seminars, fairs and expositions, journals, publications and other 
bibliography, centres of technological information and data bases) 
(f) R&D joint ventures with other enterprises or institutions (with, local or external 
enterprises from the same group, customers, suppliers, competitors, other enterprises, 
experts and consulting firms, private institutions of research, public institutions of 
research, universities)  
(g) Activities of training during the period 1992-1996 (Modes, costs and total hours)  
(h) Motivations for training  
(i) Productive, commercial and business agreements 1992/1996  
(j) Implementation of organisational techniques  
 
3. Innovative output 
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(a) Activities of technological innovation. 1992/1996 (innovation of product, innovation 
of process, design, development, automation and control, renewal of machinery and 
equipment, work re-organisation, reorganisation of productive flows, execution of 
continuous improvements, costs rationalisation, training of human resources.  
(b) Improvements in products between 1992 and 1996 (technological improvement of 
current products, new products due to advances in the technological and scientific 
base, new product due to new productive process, new product due to novel inputs, 
differentiation of products).  
(c) Improvements obtained in processes between 1992 and 1996 (technological 
improvement of current processes for equal products, machinery and equipment 
linked to new processes, new processes for new products, new process based on 
advances in the scientific and technological base) 
(d) Patents granted between 1992 and 1996 (quantity), (granted in Argentina, granted 
abroad) 
(e) Innovations objectives (total or partial replacement of yours actual products, extend 
the range of products, development of products that do not affect the environment, 
improve the quality of yours products, introduction of new materials, development of 
new equipment, Improve the flexibility of the processes, reduction of the costs of 
production, improvements in the work conditions, adoption of productive process less 
pollutant, development of innovations based on scientific innovations, adaptation of 
products to the national market, adaptation of products to the external markets) 
(f) Main factors hindering innovation  
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Annex 2: The model 
Equation (1) is derived from a Cob-Douglas production function of the form: 
 
 itititit KLAY
βα=  (2) 
 
Where Y is added value, L labour, K capital, A, and, α and β -the elasticities of output 
with respect to each input- are fixed parameters and the sub index i t indicate variation 
across firms, and time.   
 
This function is linear in the logarithms of the variables, so after taking logarithms and 
adding a stochastic disturbance term uit to account for variations in the technical or 
productive capabilities of the ith firm at the time t, we can write this relationship for t 
=1996 and t-4 =1992 as follow: 
 
)ln(lnlnln AauLKaY ititititit =+++= αβ (3) 
44444 lnlnln −−−−− +++= ititititijt uLKaY αβ (4) 
 
Then, differentiating (3-4) the change in added value for domestic firms between 1996 
and 1992 can be expressed as follow: 
 
itijijijij LKaY εαβ +∆+∆+∆=∆ lnlnln   (5)  
 
Where α and β are the participation of capital and labour in value-added.  
 
We do not have capital stock, so instead of β we estimate the marginal product of capital 
by using I/Y in 1996. 
 
 In effect ijijijij LKaY lnlnln ∆+∆+∆=∆ αβ  (5) can be written also as: 
         ijijij LK
K
Y
K
K
YaY lnln ∆+∆
∆
∆
+∆=∆ α (5`), 
 where β=
∆
∆
Y
K
K
Y .  
So, after cancelling K in equation (5`), and given that ρ=
∆
∆
K
Y  and IK =∆ , equation 
5` can be written as (6). 
 
itij
ijt
ijt
ijij LY
I
aY εαρ +∆++∆=∆ lnln  (6)  
The hypothesis that the changes in FDI participation by sector affect productivity growth 
of domestic firms is investigated by modelling the changes in a (or TFP growth) as: 
it
d
ijt
d
jrijt GIZFDIparta εηδ ++++∆=∆  (7) 
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Where, the changes in a -or TFP growth- are assumed to vary across sectors, group, Z, 
and also following changes in FDI penetration by sector. 
 
Finally, combining (6) and (7) we arrive to equation (1) in the text 
i
d
ij
d
ji
d
ij
d IiGZFDIInputY εηδλ ++++∆+∆=∆ lnln  (1) 
Where λ∆ln Input includes L and I/Y 
 
